By the standards of an objectivity that we seldom muster the national interest is a constant. Those that say so assume that it is independent of a countrys governors and of their professed ideology. Some examples support this thesis because national goals and the methods to achieve them tend to reassert themselves even after a regime change. Illustrative is Russias case. Whether ruled by Tsars or Commissars her open boundaries the tradition of expansion the fear of a hostile world and the inclination to invoke an idea to save mankind come to mind. Naturally exemptions also exist such as Switzerland and Sweden. Until 1516 the Swiss made big waves then lost a battle and decided that professional neutrality banking and watches are a better business than war. Sweden used to be an ambitious power that after a defeat at Poltava (Russia) in 1709 decided to retreat to making steel for the cannons of others.
A difficulty related to the concept is its definition. For instance does the comportment of a community organized as a nation reveal what that interest might be? Is what the inhabitants feel to be the national interest the fears the claimed successes and the musts"- match what that interest separated from dreams really is?
With that we are led to a crucial question. What is Americas national interest once confusing assumptions are peeled away to penetrate to a non-partisan core. Could we agree that it is the countrys assured existence and the survival of her culture? Would the ability to secure her day-to-day goals without resorting to violence and to prevail in any conceivable conflict that cannot be solved diplomatically be acceptable?
Once the generalizations are reduced to concrete cases we are left with issues that we regard to be of weight. The items listed can ignore themes whose significance will only emerge in the future and others that will shrink in significance later on.
In the case of the USA the attempt includes her relationship to the other potential superpowers namely Russia and China. Note that the European Union is not mentioned and that the countries are identified by a name that ignores their official ideology such as The Peoples Republic of… . The reason is in the continuity of their global policy. Matters would not be much different had in 1949 the winner been Chiang and not Mao and if the Romanovs would still rule Russia.
The other theme is nuclear proliferation as a pre-condition to avoid nuclear war and the creation of the instruments to win such a conflict in case it becomes unavoidable. Here North Korea and Iran come to mind.
The maintenance of the procedural status-quo" also has a place here. The concept means that global change while not preventable should unfold legally". Implied is that the law of nations is to be respected and that it be carried out with the consent of the global community. Such a stipulation has a logical extension that pertains to the internal order of states. Americas interest is that countries become as democratic as their level of development and traditions permit. Without practicing interventionism without intending to export the American System" the US exerts influence by indirectly facilitating the economic and political democratization of nations.
The achievement of these goals depends upon several conditions. One is the US economic political and military power. However in itself a countrys mass" does not equal its ability to project influence. Some states are less effective than their weight-class warrants. Often the USA has under-achieved relative to her potential. France international role exceeds her size population means and might. Credit the clever conversion of appearances into influence by resolute leaders.
With this said we get to where abstractions dovetail into the presents specifics. As insinuated the assertion of the national interest depends besides physical factors national power and the weight-class of foes- on the quality of leadership. Presently American interests are represented by Trumps administration. According to the moments fashion petty politics do not stop at the waters edge however their consequence is regardless of your like or dislike of Trump decisive.
We like to forget that the world has always been a dangerous place. Trumps foreign policy faces challenges that so the national interest says are best solved by peaceful means and with the assent of all contracting parties. The ability to negotiate mutually gainful deals that are secured by consent demands that America be well represented. An aspect of being convincing is the background music provided by the rambunctious orchestra that being star-studded likes to play loud and out of tune. Much of the outcome depends on the Presidents projected image. If in the area of the essentials he appears to have the support of the government apparatus and provided that his own commitment to what he advocates is credible then he will be effective in his role to secure some of what could not have been had otherwise.
Whatever the quality of the case made domestically against Trump might be the projected image reduces the Presidents credibility and thereby the US potential to achieve her foreign policy goals. Some might detect a benefit to their domestic agenda if Trump can be denied success by undermining his credibility. That local advantage carries a price to be paid by Americas damaged interests abroad.
A TV station consulted for its news by this writer is the International" version of a major US channel. While the international edition is superior to the fare served at home the impression created is stunning. Daily Breaking News" announce that Trump is about to be over. Even if those in Europe who decide what the news is are not friends of POTUS zapping to them gives the feeling of having landed in a different universe. During the Cold War the best source of anti-American propaganda came from US sources. Little has changed in this respect.
The attacks that express the desire to score in the next election extracts a price in global affairs. The more convincing the impressions of Trumps imminent demise the more the chances shrink of achieving security through diplomacy. If Trump is losing power at home if his officials rebel once the judiciary demolishes his legitimacy then he is not in control of a country that is said to revolt against his government. Once Trump is made to appear to be without a party and a majority then his threats are hollow and his promises unrealizable. This is apt to provoke resistance and defiance. In Tweeter terms a bad thing" but foolishly not unwanted because failure is proof of ineptitude and that facilitates the dismissal of the enemy of mankind" in the next election.
Let us concentrate on the cases of Russia and Kims Korea. Both are lead by persons that project a strength their land does not quite have and they claim a degree of personal control they dread losing. Clearly they wish to deal with a credible partner who can guarantee that what he says goes. The assurances they seek pertain to the inviolability of their domain and their personal rule.
In the light of the foregoing and the errors of the West in general- it is surprising that Russia is not a greater problem than it is. Her assertiveness grows and to weaken America it often bolsters forces such as Iran that will ultimately turn against Moscow. Attribute this to a by domestic design waning respect for a country with inward looking elites that indulge in self-induced paralysis and a checkmated President. Could it be that government by Tweet" is still better than government by tumult"?
Concerning Russia the Presidents ritualized flagellation for using formal and informal channels to convince an inherited opponent that it can be a partner is causing major damage. The tone of the attacks on Trump for his alleged Russia-policy convinces chauvinists in Russia that America is their countrys sworn enemy. To avoid the charge of being soft on Russia it might be added that in the management of her relations with the West and with America she is confusing tactical considerations with strategic interests. The concluding sigh: what a pity for a thrown away chance".
While the Russia policy can recover from its sub-optimal level the North Korean matter is different. The costs of mistakes that bring about a worse case scenario are paramount and some of the consequences might not be repairable. The quality of the relationship having been what it was and by the standards of conventional punditry the apparent break through appears to be unexpected. If the walls of the nuclear cul-de-sac can be broken to create a passage furthermore if the tension between Tokyo Seoul and Pyongyang can be reduced then peace is saved and time is gained for beneficial processes to unfold.
Such vistas are unexpected and demand an explanation. Its centerpiece is Trumps conduct of foreign relations. That story begins with the unusual freedom extended in Korean matters to Trump by his domestic antagonists. The leniency" might come from the sobering prospect of nuclear war Kims personality and his ham-fisted crisis management. Decisive might be that several presidents have failed in Korea. Letting Trump off the leash seemed to promise that as desired he too would fail.
Now lights blink in the Korean tunnel. If some credit for that is given to Trump the question arises how come that a player said to be uncouth undiplomatic short-sighted and erratic could achieve what others have failed to accomplish. What follows contradicts accepted PC-wisdom and negates established doctrine.
Let us begin with the sanctions imposed on N. Korea. Liberal consensus claims that sanctions do not work. (Those that say so also reject all other measures which means that aggression is accepted after formal protest restrained lest it provokes their extremists".) Trump-inspired sanctions once China could be convinced that Kim is a threat to its interests have worked. Mainly however it is what traditional foreign policy hands find wrong in Trump is what might have facilitated the slow turn-around.
Past aggressors have followed a predictable and profitable pattern. A crisis was provoked. That might have brought the world close to what was said to be an abyss". The liberal reaction to the madness attributed to the provocation had been predictable and as such devoid of fantasy. The perpetrator threatened loudly not to care and to slip further toward destruction. Thus the world had to be saved by sane" statesmen from destruction. Therefore a compromise was reached. The aggressor kept what he had promised for the time being- not to take more and to crawl back from suicide". Trump in the White House shredded this script.
For one thing Trump cultivates unpredictability and he can match the rewarded antics of of the profitably irresponsible" and irrational" loudly braying actors on the world stage. With the unintended help of his domestic detractors he has achieved the reputation of being not only impulsive but to be also to be willing to do anything previously anathema to western leaders. Playing the game by his own rules meant that those flirting with the threatened abyss were told you will be missed but go ahead and let me help you with a push". This undiplomatic crudeness" introduced a new script and novel casting for the game and it abandoned the old ritual of crisis concessions and final compromise". With some amusement we note that while all wonder what Trump will do next the threat of self-destruction had lost much of its attraction once it was met with a yawn.
Trump might not fit the conventional and limiting role-model cast for American and global politicians. To the extent that he is effective where others were not it is attributable to the flexibility gained by jettisoning the ballast of curtailing old models. Ultimately the US and the world might be thankful for the upshot. Meanwhile let us label the experiment as the pursuit of the lasting national interest with unpredictably innovative means".
By the standards of an objectivity that we seldom muster the national interest is a constant. Those that say so assume that it is independent of a countrys governors and of their professed ideology. Some examples support this thesis because national goals and the methods to achieve them tend to reassert themselves even after a regime change. Illustrative is Russias case. Whether ruled by Tsars or Commissars her open boundaries the tradition of expansion the fear of a hostile world and the inclination to invoke an idea to save mankind come to mind. Naturally exemptions also exist such as Switzerland and Sweden. Until 1516 the Swiss made big waves then lost a battle and decided that professional neutrality banking and watches are a better business than war. Sweden used to be an ambitious power that after a defeat at Poltava (Russia) in 1709 decided to retreat to making steel for the cannons of others.
A difficulty related to the concept is its definition. For instance does the comportment of a community organized as a nation reveal what that interest might be? Is what the inhabitants feel to be the national interest the fears the claimed successes and the musts"- match what that interest separated from dreams really is?
With that we are led to a crucial question. What is Americas national interest once confusing assumptions are peeled away to penetrate to a non-partisan core. Could we agree that it is the countrys assured existence and the survival of her culture? Would the ability to secure her day-to-day goals without resorting to violence and to prevail in any conceivable conflict that cannot be solved diplomatically be acceptable?
Once the generalizations are reduced to concrete cases we are left with issues that we regard to be of weight. The items listed can ignore themes whose significance will only emerge in the future and others that will shrink in significance later on.
In the case of the USA the attempt includes her relationship to the other potential superpowers namely Russia and China. Note that the European Union is not mentioned and that the countries are identified by a name that ignores their official ideology such as The Peoples Republic of… . The reason is in the continuity of their global policy. Matters would not be much different had in 1949 the winner been Chiang and not Mao and if the Romanovs would still rule Russia.
The other theme is nuclear proliferation as a pre-condition to avoid nuclear war and the creation of the instruments to win such a conflict in case it becomes unavoidable. Here North Korea and Iran come to mind.
The maintenance of the procedural status-quo" also has a place here. The concept means that global change while not preventable should unfold legally". Implied is that the law of nations is to be respected and that it be carried out with the consent of the global community. Such a stipulation has a logical extension that pertains to the internal order of states. Americas interest is that countries become as democratic as their level of development and traditions permit. Without practicing interventionism without intending to export the American System" the US exerts influence by indirectly facilitating the economic and political democratization of nations.
The achievement of these goals depends upon several conditions. One is the US economic political and military power. However in itself a countrys mass" does not equal its ability to project influence. Some states are less effective than their weight-class warrants. Often the USA has under-achieved relative to her potential. France international role exceeds her size population means and might. Credit the clever conversion of appearances into influence by resolute leaders.
With this said we get to where abstractions dovetail into the presents specifics. As insinuated the assertion of the national interest depends besides physical factors national power and the weight-class of foes- on the quality of leadership. Presently American interests are represented by Trumps administration. According to the moments fashion petty politics do not stop at the waters edge however their consequence is regardless of your like or dislike of Trump decisive.
We like to forget that the world has always been a dangerous place. Trumps foreign policy faces challenges that so the national interest says are best solved by peaceful means and with the assent of all contracting parties. The ability to negotiate mutually gainful deals that are secured by consent demands that America be well represented. An aspect of being convincing is the background music provided by the rambunctious orchestra that being star-studded likes to play loud and out of tune. Much of the outcome depends on the Presidents projected image. If in the area of the essentials he appears to have the support of the government apparatus and provided that his own commitment to what he advocates is credible then he will be effective in his role to secure some of what could not have been had otherwise.
Whatever the quality of the case made domestically against Trump might be the projected image reduces the Presidents credibility and thereby the US potential to achieve her foreign policy goals. Some might detect a benefit to their domestic agenda if Trump can be denied success by undermining his credibility. That local advantage carries a price to be paid by Americas damaged interests abroad.
A TV station consulted for its news by this writer is the International" version of a major US channel. While the international edition is superior to the fare served at home the impression created is stunning. Daily Breaking News" announce that Trump is about to be over. Even if those in Europe who decide what the news is are not friends of POTUS zapping to them gives the feeling of having landed in a different universe. During the Cold War the best source of anti-American propaganda came from US sources. Little has changed in this respect.
The attacks that express the desire to score in the next election extracts a price in global affairs. The more convincing the impressions of Trumps imminent demise the more the chances shrink of achieving security through diplomacy. If Trump is losing power at home if his officials rebel once the judiciary demolishes his legitimacy then he is not in control of a country that is said to revolt against his government. Once Trump is made to appear to be without a party and a majority then his threats are hollow and his promises unrealizable. This is apt to provoke resistance and defiance. In Tweeter terms a bad thing" but foolishly not unwanted because failure is proof of ineptitude and that facilitates the dismissal of the enemy of mankind" in the next election.
Let us concentrate on the cases of Russia and Kims Korea. Both are lead by persons that project a strength their land does not quite have and they claim a degree of personal control they dread losing. Clearly they wish to deal with a credible partner who can guarantee that what he says goes. The assurances they seek pertain to the inviolability of their domain and their personal rule.
In the light of the foregoing and the errors of the West in general- it is surprising that Russia is not a greater problem than it is. Her assertiveness grows and to weaken America it often bolsters forces such as Iran that will ultimately turn against Moscow. Attribute this to a by domestic design waning respect for a country with inward looking elites that indulge in self-induced paralysis and a checkmated President. Could it be that government by Tweet" is still better than government by tumult"?
Concerning Russia the Presidents ritualized flagellation for using formal and informal channels to convince an inherited opponent that it can be a partner is causing major damage. The tone of the attacks on Trump for his alleged Russia-policy convinces chauvinists in Russia that America is their countrys sworn enemy. To avoid the charge of being soft on Russia it might be added that in the management of her relations with the West and with America she is confusing tactical considerations with strategic interests. The concluding sigh: what a pity for a thrown away chance".
While the Russia policy can recover from its sub-optimal level the North Korean matter is different. The costs of mistakes that bring about a worse case scenario are paramount and some of the consequences might not be repairable. The quality of the relationship having been what it was and by the standards of conventional punditry the apparent break through appears to be unexpected. If the walls of the nuclear cul-de-sac can be broken to create a passage furthermore if the tension between Tokyo Seoul and Pyongyang can be reduced then peace is saved and time is gained for beneficial processes to unfold.
Such vistas are unexpected and demand an explanation. Its centerpiece is Trumps conduct of foreign relations. That story begins with the unusual freedom extended in Korean matters to Trump by his domestic antagonists. The leniency" might come from the sobering prospect of nuclear war Kims personality and his ham-fisted crisis management. Decisive might be that several presidents have failed in Korea. Letting Trump off the leash seemed to promise that as desired he too would fail.
Now lights blink in the Korean tunnel. If some credit for that is given to Trump the question arises how come that a player said to be uncouth undiplomatic short-sighted and erratic could achieve what others have failed to accomplish. What follows contradicts accepted PC-wisdom and negates established doctrine.
Let us begin with the sanctions imposed on N. Korea. Liberal consensus claims that sanctions do not work. (Those that say so also reject all other measures which means that aggression is accepted after formal protest restrained lest it provokes their extremists".) Trump-inspired sanctions once China could be convinced that Kim is a threat to its interests have worked. Mainly however it is what traditional foreign policy hands find wrong in Trump is what might have facilitated the slow turn-around.
Past aggressors have followed a predictable and profitable pattern. A crisis was provoked. That might have brought the world close to what was said to be an abyss". The liberal reaction to the madness attributed to the provocation had been predictable and as such devoid of fantasy. The perpetrator threatened loudly not to care and to slip further toward destruction. Thus the world had to be saved by sane" statesmen from destruction. Therefore a compromise was reached. The aggressor kept what he had promised for the time being- not to take more and to crawl back from suicide". Trump in the White House shredded this script.
For one thing Trump cultivates unpredictability and he can match the rewarded antics of of the profitably irresponsible" and irrational" loudly braying actors on the world stage. With the unintended help of his domestic detractors he has achieved the reputation of being not only impulsive but to be also to be willing to do anything previously anathema to western leaders. Playing the game by his own rules meant that those flirting with the threatened abyss were told you will be missed but go ahead and let me help you with a push". This undiplomatic crudeness" introduced a new script and novel casting for the game and it abandoned the old ritual of crisis concessions and final compromise". With some amusement we note that while all wonder what Trump will do next the threat of self-destruction had lost much of its attraction once it was met with a yawn.
Trump might not fit the conventional and limiting role-model cast for American and global politicians. To the extent that he is effective where others were not it is attributable to the flexibility gained by jettisoning the ballast of curtailing old models. Ultimately the US and the world might be thankful for the upshot. Meanwhile let us label the experiment as the pursuit of the lasting national interest with unpredictably innovative means".