Hudson Institute scholar Michael Dorans February 2 2015 essay
Obamas Secret Iran Strategy"
1 demonstrates that a very flawed U.S. policy towards Iran actually helped breed Sunni backing for the radical
Islamic State 2. Due to what former Senior Director at the National Security Council Elliott Abrams terms Obamas
ideology"
3 the administration not only
failed to comprehend 4 Iranian culture 5 and the absolutist theological nature of the Islamic Republic of Irana blunder already begun in the Carter White House and perpetuated through all subsequent administrationsbut also compounded the error by believing that the mullah regime could be enticed to moderate its
behavior 6.
A year after the implementation of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 7 we find Majlis Speaker of Parliament hard-liner
Ali Larijani 8 threatening that Iran may violate the JCPOA with a new
startup of nuclear enrichment 9 if any new sanctions are employed against Iran for its alleged nuclear activities or those which UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon criticized in his
report 10 concerning
ballistic missile 11 tests. So too the
BfV 12 Germanys domestic security apparatus indicates that Iran has attempted to buy
illegal nuclear technology 13 since last years deal. Additionally a recent
report 14 indicates that Iran has stepped-up its cyberwar capabilities against the West. Thus its clear that the White Houses supposition that Iran would begin to
change its behavior 15 has
proven erroneous 16. In reality
Irans leader 17 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has
not changed 18 his
opposition to the United States 19 one iota 20. Indeed the monies Iran has reaped from the deal have not been funneled to improve the Iranian economy but instead have found their way to
increased Iranian support 21 for the Syrian regime 22 of Bashar el-Assad and its various
terrorist proxies 23particularly
Hezbollah 24in Lebanon Iraq
Yemen Bahrain25 and Gaza.
Having pulled all US troops out of Iraq
without stabilizing the situation 26 between the warring Sunni and Shia populations the administration not only allowed Iran to continue to support and fund the most
radical Shia factions 27 and
their militias 28 but also gave the radical
Dawa partys
29 Prime Minister
Nouri Kamal al-Maliki 30 the chance to suppress the Sunni minority. The result of allowing
al-Maliki 31 to continue his
sectarian oppression of the Sunnis 32 was to cause a large portion of
Sunnis to become radicalized 33 and support the formation of the
Islamic State 34 particularly among former Baathist army officers and officials. As
Irans radical Shia agenda 35 became more prevalent in Iraq leading both the Tehran-led
Badr Organization 36 militia and other
Shia militias 37 such as
Asaib Ahl al Haq or League of the Righteous" to attack and assassinate Sunnis particularly those that had any ties to the Saddam regime the Sunnis
reacted 38 and thus
ISIS 39/the Islamic State found a steady supply of local recruits.
For the United States to win the war against the Islamic State it is necessary not only to destroy it physically but also to reverse the conditions that made it popular with a good portion of the Sunni masses. Unfortunately the
U.S. is relying 40 on Iraqs Shia
Popular Mobilization Units 41(PMUs) which too often
commit atrocities 42 against the
fragmented Sunni minority.
43
As long as the
current policy 44 of relying on the Shia PMUs in its fight with Islamic State the U.S. will fail to tame Iraq and arrest the sectarian wars. The PMUs are
in essence 45Iranian proxies 46 as their battlefield leadership is poignantly demonstrated by the presence of Major General
Qassem Soleimani47 commander of the
Qods Force 48 of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (
IRGC/Pasdaran)
49 in Iraq at
Takrit 50 and
Fallujah 51 during the battles there. Soleimani not only advises but actually directs the battles and is
aided by his own Qods Force troops 52 as well as Shiite
Fatemiyoun 53 recruits from
Afghanistan and Pakistan 54 that have been employed to bolster
Hezbollah 55 in Syria.
Accountability and strict discipline 56 need to be enforced in American relations with Iraq. Leading from behind" will not do in any manner whatsoeverthats an open invitation to the Islamic State to morph into another terrorist entity. Boots on the ground and officials in Baghdad to enforce
strict compliance with a non-sectarian agenda 57 will be required. With careful instruction and guidance we succeeded in the
Tribal Awakening"
58 of 2006-2007 and the
Surge"
59 of 2007-2008; future success requires similar diligence on our part along with that of the Government of Iraq. But this time we need to stay the course and not retreat from the arena until Iraq is at peace with itself. Given the right support the GOI will opt for a successful
harmonious 60 state. But with the long history of mutual Sunni-Shia animosity and the ferocity of both sides in attacking the other it will not be simple or quickly achieved. However if we withhold our support and supervision Iraq will not achieve peace and will continue to be a weak client of Iran whose
malevolent agenda 61 is all too well known from the past thirteen years of experience.
Across the border in Syria the situation is somewhat more complicated. The
moderate" opposition 62thought by the U.S. to be concentrated in the Syrian Free Army (SFA) has recently allied itself with
jihadist militias 63 fighting the Assad regime especially in the
current battle 64 over
Aleppo.
65 Although the
al-Qaeda affiliate
Jabhat al-Nusra led by
Abu Mohammed al-Golani66 has split recently from
al-Qaeda in order to form
Jabhat Fatah el al-Sham 67 as an
umbrella organization 68 of all non-Islamic State Sunni opposition to the Assad regime the
jihadi agenda 69 it espouses has
not changed 70 at all. Like Islamic State
Jabhat Fatah el al-Sham seeks to remove the Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state.
The only Syrian group working actively against Islamic State in Syria is the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces which recently
took the city 71 of Manbij from IS after a
two-month siege.
72 This Kurdish dominated coalition is made up of the Syrian
YPG 73 and a
variety of Arab minorities.
74
Success 75 against the Islamic State both in Iraq and in Syria is hampered by our reliance on Irans Shiite axis in Iraq while attempting to remove Irans client in Syria. Our
friends"76 in these complicated fights do not share our values nor do they have similar goals and objectives for final outcomes. Until we realize that every coalition action that we take has multiple repercussions because of our
allies"77 all-too-frequent
misdeeds78 we will continue to fail to bring any sense of calm to the area. As mentioned above
leading from behind"79 is a guarantee of failure. Success will require tremendous effort diligence and hands-on supervision in order to prevent sectarian violence against civilians minorities and the less devout. And this problem will not be solved quickly no matter how much we wish it. But
ignoring it 80 will only allow it to fester and grow much more
dangerous 81 and lethal.
Rabbi Dr. Daniel M. Zucker author of over one hundred articles on the Middle-East is founder and Chairman of the Board of Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East
an organization dedicated to teaching the public about the dangers posed by radical Islamic fundamentalism. He may be contacted at [email protected] and/or [email protected].
__________________________________________________
Notes:
1. Michael Doran Obamas Secret Iran Strategy"
Mosaic Magazine February 2 2015 http://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2015/02/obamas-secret-iran-strategy/.
2. Anonymous Analyzing the ISIS Timeline: The Rise of the Islamic State (ISIL / ISIS)"
Ntrepid Timestream 2015 http://www.ntrepidcorp.com/timestream/isis/.
3. Elliot Abrams What the President Thinks Hes Doing"
Mosaic Magazine February 9 2015 http://mosaicmagazine.com/response/2015/02/what-the-president-thinks-hes-doing/.
4. Daniel M. Zucker The Fallacies Undergirding the Current U.S. Policy towards Iran"
American Thinker June 24 2016 http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/06/the_fallacies_undergirding_the_current_us_policy_toward_iran.html.
5. Harold Rhode The Sources of Iranian Negotiating Behavior"
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Strategic Perspectives Number 6 2010 http://www.jcpa.org/text/iranian_behavior.pdf.
6. Barney Breen-Portnoy Former Pentagon Analyst: As in Past Iran Seeking to Humiliate US With Accusations of Nuclear-Deal Violations (INTERVIEW)"
The Algemeiner August 22 2016 http://www.algemeiner.com/2016/08/22/former-pentagon-analyst-as-in-past-iran-seeking-to-humiliate-us-with-accusations-of-nuclear-deal-violations-interview/.
7. Anonymous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action"
eeas.europa.eu Vienna July 14 2015 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf.
8. Thomas Erdbrink Iran Lawmakers Re-elect Their Conservative Speaker Ali Larijani"
The New York Times May 31 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/world/middleeast/iran-ali-larijani.html?_r=2.
9. Anonymous Larijani urges AEOI to devise plan to set up nuclear enrichment plant"
Iran Republic News Agency July 20 2016 http://www8.irna.ir/en/News/82156410/.
10. Ben Ariel Iran blasts UN chiefs criticism of its ballistic missiles"
Arutz Sheva July 9 2016 http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/214702.
11 Uzi Rubin The Nuclear Agreement Boosts Irans Missile Threat"
Defense News October 15 2015 http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/10/05/nuclear-agreement-boosts-irans-missile-threat/73388484/.
12. Thomas de Maizire et. al. Verfassungsschutzbericht 2015
Bundesministerium des Innern July 2016 https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2015.pdf.
13. Jack Moore German Intelligence: Iran Has Attempted to Buy Illegal Nuclear Technology After 2015 Deal" Newsweek July 8 2016 http://www.newsweek.com/german-intelligence-iran-attempted-buy-illegal-nuclear-technology-478770.
14. Michael Eisenstadt Irans Lengthening Cyber Shadow"
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy No. 34 July 2016 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote34_Eisenstadt.pdf.
15. Y. Carmon and A. Savyon Senior Iranian Officials: The U.S. Has Met Its Obligations Under The JCPOA; The Initial Sanctions Remain In Force Because Iran Rejected Negotiations On Human Rights Violations Terrorism"
MEMRI Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1264 August 15 2016 http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/9393.htm.
16. Bob Blackman MP It does no good to expect the best from Iran"
The Hill: Congress Blog July 31 2016 http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/289836-it-does-no-good-to-expect-the-best-from-iran.
17. Arash Karami Rouhani echoes Khameneis mistrust of US as nuke deal grumbles persist"
Al-Monitor August 3 2016 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/iran-us-negotiations-rouhani-khamenei-nuclear-deal.html.
18. Special Dispatch No.6563 One Year After JCPOA: Iran-U.S. Relations According To Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei"
MEMRI August 9 2016 http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/9377.htm.
19. IFP Coverage US Unreliability Proved by JCPOA Experience: Leader"
Iran Front Page August 1 2016 http://ifpnews.com/news/politics/nuclear/2016/08/us-unreliability-proved-jcpoa-experience-leader/.
20. Jay Solomon Why the Ayatollah Thinks He Won"
The Wall Street Journal August 19 2016 http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-ayatollah-thinks-he-won-1471627970.
21. Emanuele Ottolenghi and Annie Fixler One year on the Iran deal is still bad"
Jewish Journal July 26 2016 http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/one_year_on_the_iran_deal_is_still_bad.
22. AIPAC Memo State Department: Iran Remains the Foremost State Sponsor of Terrorism"
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) June 9 2016 http://www.aipac.org/-/media/publications/policy-and-politics/aipac-analyses/issue-memos/2016/statedepartment.pdf.
23. Avi Issacharoff Boosted by nuke deal Iran ups funding to Hezbollah Hamas"
The Times of Israel September 21 2015 http://www.timesofisrael.com/boosted-by-nuke-deal-iran-ups-funding-to-hezbollah-hamas/.
24. Anonymous Weapons drugs and global terror: Hezbollah as an international threat"
Israel Defense Forces July 12 2016 .
25. Matthew Levitt Hezbollahs Pivot Toward the Gulf"
CTC Sentinel August 22 2016 https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/hezbollahs-pivot-toward-the-gulf and
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy August 22 2016 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Levitt20160822-CTCSentinel.pdf.
26. Frank R. Gunter Once Fooled in Iraq"
U.S. News and World Report July 27 2016 http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-07-27/next-president-cannot-repeat-obamas-mistake-in-iraq-with-the-islamic-state.
27. Anonymous Dawa Party: An American-Iranian failure"
Middle East Monitor March 22 2016 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160322-dawa-party-an-american-iranian-failure/.
28. Muhannad Al-Ghazi No end to the militias in Iraq"
Al-Monitor August 7 2016 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/jaish-al-moumal-muqtada-sadr-iraq-iran-shiite-militias.html.
29. Ali Mamouri Is Iraqs Dawa Party on verge of division?"
Al-Monitor October 28 2015 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/iraq-dawa-party-division-maliki-abadi.html.
30. Ned Parker and Raheem Salman Notes From The Underground: The Rise of Nouri al-Maliki"
World Policy Journal Spring 2013 http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/spring2013/maliki.
31. Biography.com Editors Nouri al-Maliki Biography"
The Biography.com website publication date: n/a access date: August 13 2016 http://www.biography.com/people/nouri-al-maliki-504526.
32. Oudai Hatem Iraqi Sahwa Movement Leader Slams Maliki as Sectarian"
Al-Monitor February 23 2013 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/02/maliki-faces-accusations-sectarianism.html.
33. Brian Stewart ISIS the terrible twos"
The Jerusalem Post July 31 2016 http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/ISIS-the-terrible-twos-462779.
34. Ilana Freedman JIHAD! Understanding the Threat of the Islamic State to America
The Center for Security Policy Washington DC c. 2016 https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/Jihad_Islamic_State.pdf.
35. Ali Khedery Irans Shiite Militias Are Running Amok in Iraq"
FP February 19 2015 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/19/irans-shiite-militias-are-running-amok-in-iraq/.
36. Anonymous Badr Organization"
Wikipedia accessed: July 27 2016 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Badr_Organization.
37. David Zucchino In Iraq Shiite militias are both friend and foe"
Los Angeles Times October 30 2014 http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-shiite-militias-20141030-story.html.
38. Hassan Abu Haniyeh Debate: ISIS has succeeded thanks to the sectarian policies of its opponents"
Asharq al-Awsat July 7 2014 http://english.aawsat.com/2014/07/article55334016/debate-isis-has-succeeded-thanks-to-the-sectarian-policies-of-its-opponents.
39. Suhaib Anjarini The Evolution of ISIS"
Al-Monitor November 1 2013 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/security/2013/11/syria-islamic-state-iraq-sham-growth.html.
40. Ali Mamouri Has the U.S. Found a New Friend in Iraqs Shiite Militias?"
U.S. News and World Report March 31 2016 http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-03-31/has-the-us-found-a-new-friend-in-iraqs-shiite-militias.
41. Ali Mamouri Concern in Iraq grows over unregulated Shiite forces"
Al-Monitor February 17 2015 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iraq-popular-mobilization-crimes-government-control.html.
42. Anhvinh Doanvo Murder and MilitiasIraqs Sunni-Shiite Plan After ISIS"
The World Post July 20 2016 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anhvinh-doanvo/murder-and-militiasiraqs-_b_10994240.html.
43. Omar Al-Nidawi The State of Sunni Discord in Iraq" Fikra Forum August 11 2016 http://fikraforum.org/?p=10031#.V69D4DW-F2B.
44. Brian Stewart Iraqs Downward Spiral: A Boon to ISIS"
Counter Extremism Project May 20 2016 http://www.counterextremism.com/blog/iraqE28099s-downward-spiral-boon-isis.
45. Dalshad Abdullah Iranian Revolutionary Guards Inaugurate Center for Recruiting Youth in Kirkuk"
Asharq al-Awsat February 16 2016 http://english.aawsat.com/2016/02/article55347497/iranian-revolutionary-guards-inaugurate-center-for-recruiting-youth-in-kirkuk.
46. Jonathan Spyer & Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi How Iraq Became a Proxy of the Islamic Republic of Iran"
The Tower Magazine Issue 21 December 2014 http://www.thetower.org/article/how-iraq-became-a-wholly-owned-subsidiary-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran/.
47. Anonymous Who is Major General Qasim Soleimani?"
Near East Center for Strategic Engagement June 4 2016 https://nec-se.com/2016/06/04/who-is-major-general-qasim-soleimani/.
48. Anonymous Qods Force / Sepah-e Qods / Qods Corps / Jerusalem Corps"
Global Security.org accessed: August 12 2016 http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/qods.htm.
49. Anonymous Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)"
Counter Extremism Project accessed: August 5 2016 http://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/irgc-threat-report.pdf.
50. James Rosen Quds force leader commanding Iraqi forces against ISIS alarms Washington"
Fox News March 5 2015 .
51. Bill Roggio & Amir Toumaj Qods Force general vows to fight in Iraq and Syria until the last jihadist is killed"
The Long War Journal June 17 2016 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/qods-force-general-vows-to-fight-in-iraq-and-syria-until-the-last-jihadis-is-killed.php.
52. Loveday Morris Photo: Were Iranian soldiers fighting in Tikrit?"
The Washington Post April 2 2015 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/04/02/photo-were-iranian-soldiers-fighting-in-tikrit/.
53. Farzin Nadimi Irans Afghan and Pakistani Proxies: In Syria and Beyond?"
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy-watch 2677 August 22 2016 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-afghan-and-pakistani-proxies-in-syria-and-beyond?.
54. Ari Heistein James West Syrias Other Foreign Fighters: Irans Afghan and Pakistani Mercenaries"
The National Interest November 20 2015 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/syrias-other-foreign-fighters-irans-afghan-pakistani-14400.
55. Clare Lopez Freed-Up Frozen Funds Sanctions Relief and Ransoms Only Aid Irans Global Crime Syndicate"
CNS News August 10 2016 http://www.cnsnews.com/commentary/clare-lopez/freed-frozen-funds-sanctions-relief-and-ransoms-only-aid-irans-global-crime.
56. Mara Revkin Law and Lawfare in the Islamic State"
Lawfare August 5 2016 https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-and-lawfare-islamic-state?utm_campaign=BrookingsBrief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=32570092. See especially section Conclusion".
57. Craig Whiteside The Moral Hazard of the Fight Against the Islamic State in Iraq"
War on the Rocks February 16 2016 http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/the-moral-hazard-of-the-fight-against-the-islamic-state-in-iraq/.
58. Anonymous The Sahwa / Awakening Councils / Sons of Iraq SOI Hashid Watani (national mobilization)"
Global Security.org accessed: August 5 2016 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/awakening.htm.
59. David Petraeus How we won in Iraq"
FP October 29 2013 http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/29/how-we-won-in-iraq/.
60. Ghassan Atiyyah A Call for Peaceful and Constitutional Reform in Iraq"
Fikra Forum August 11 2016 http://fikraforum.org/?p=10047#.V6_YpjW-F2B.
61. Anonymous US Military Strength: AssessmentThreatsMiddle East"
The Heritage Foundation c. 2016 http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/assessments/threats/middle-east/. See especially material on
Hezbollah and Iran.
62. Jonathan Spyer Who should rule Syria? Nobody"
The Spectator August 20 2016 http://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/08/who-should-rule-syria-nobody/.
63. Thomas Joscelyn Jihadists and other rebels attack Syrian regime positions in Latakia province"
The Long War Journal June 28 2016 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/jihadists-and-other-rebels-attack-syrian-regime-positions-in-latakia-province.php.
64. Amir Toumaj Iranian media report deployment of elite Iraqi Lebanese combatants to Aleppo"
Threat Matrix/The Long War Journal August 9 2016 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/iranian-media-report-deployment-of-elite-iraqi-lebanese-combatants-to-aleppo.php.
65. Borzou Daragahi This Is Why The Syrian Rebels Takeover Of Aleppo Matters So Much"
Buzz Feed News August 12 2016 https://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/heres-how-syrian-rebels-broke-the-siege-of-aleppo?utm_term=.ujxMJmdpl#.yt14Jbq9j.
66. Sardar Mlla Drwish Who is Golani Nusras No. 1 man?"
Al-Monitor August 8 2016 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/syria-who-is-jolani-jabhat-fateh-al-sham.html.
67. Mona Alami Jabhat al-Nusras rebranding is more than simple name change"
Al-Monitor August 5 2016 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/jabhat-al-nusra-sever-al-qaeda-focus-local-syria.html.
68. Alex Crawford Rebranded Nusra Front Uniting Syrias Rebels"
Sky News August 18 2016 http://news.sky.com/story/rebels-unite-in-fight-against-horsemen-of-syrian-apocalypse-10541843.
69. Mordechai Kedar Why Jabhat al Nusra has divorced from al Qaeda"
Arutz Sheva August 5 2016 .
70. Yoram Schweitzer From Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fateh a-Sham: Can a Leopard Change its Spots?"
The Institute for National Strategic Studies INSS Insight No. 843 August 7 2016 http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=12199.
71. Rouba El Husseini Rebels turn tables on regime as IS loses Syria bastion"
The Times of Israel August 6 2016 http://www.timesofisrael.com/rebels-turn-tables-on-regime-as-is-loses-syria-bastion/.
72. Rick Noack Syrians lift veils and cut beards after being liberated from Islamic State rule"
The Washington Post August 13 2016 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/13/syrians-lift-veils-and-cut-beards-after-being-liberated-from-islamic-state-rule/.
73. Anonymous YPG: Peoples Protection Units"
The Kurdish Project accessed: August 9 2016 http://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-nationalism/peoples-protection-units-ypg/.
74. Anonymous Syrian Democratic Forces"
Military.wikia.com accessed: August 9 2016 http://military.wikia.com/wiki/Syrian_Democratic_Forces.
75. Jonathan Spyer War of attrition: The Syrian rebellion grinds on into its 6th year with no end in sight"
The Jerusalem Post August 13 2016 http://www.jpost.com/Jerusalem-Report/WAR-OF-ATTRITION-463726.
76. Zvi Barel Spilling Blood in War on ISIS Kurds Pay Heavy Price for U.S.-Turkey Ties"
Haaretz August 25 2015
http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/.premium-1.738779 or first two articles at http://azvsas.blogspot.com/2016/08/danger-to-rojava-as-united-states.html.
77. Phillip Smyth Should Iraqs ISCI Forces Really Be Considered Good Militias?"
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy-watch 2674 August 17 2016 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/should-iraqs-isci-forces-really-be-considered-good-militias.
78. Ned Parker and Jonathan Landay Special Report: Massacre reports show U.S. inability to curb Iraq militias"
Reuters August 23 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-massacres-falluja-special-report-idUSKCN10Y1VD.
79. Bret Stephens The New Dictators Club"
The Wall Street Journal August 22 2016 http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-dictators-club-1471908089.
80. Jeff Gerth/ProPublica and Joby Warrick Promises unfulfilled: How a State Department plan to stabilize Iraq broke apart"
The Washington Post August 15 2016 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/promises-unfulfilled-how-a-state-department-plan-to-stabilize-iraq-broke-apart/2016/08/15/82e2324e-5a8c-11e6-831d-0324760ca856_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop_b.
81. Haitham Numan The Next Iraq"
Fikra Forum August 10 2016 http://fikraforum.org/?p=10018#.V6_vsjW-F2B.
