When the glorious past" attracts in the bleak present.
A madness thought to be banished into the sealed coffin of bygone times is reemerging. The returning Dracula threatens the destruction of the procedural order that preventively canalizes conflicts among advanced nations. Some of the discord has roots in the communist pasts refurbished Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty. The remainder is contributed by the resurrected components of vintage czarist imperialism. In international relations the aggressive empire building assumed mummified for good is again reemerging. The Russian successor to the Soviet state pursues the tradition of conquest bequeathed by the Romanovs.
Recent events suggest a disturbing diagnosis. In the case of Putinism - to Russias ultimate detriment - territorial restoration is enlisted to serve an economically underdeveloped and politically retrograde system. Power conquest and collective pride are exploited as an ersatz" for democracy progress and material well-being. Instead of addressing itself to modernization Moscow seeks domestic popularity by relying on the sole yardstick by which it ranks as a top nation".
Some modernizers operate in a national context that produces good cultural learners. These are able to emulate and adapt advanced systems without feeling humiliated. If this is the case the pressing task of catching" up is disconnected from shame" and the fear of a lost national identity. In these instances the purpose of upgrading is not the upper hand in an anticipated military confrontation between teacher" and pupil".
Here realism requires an amendment. It acknowledges that the impulse for modernization tends to come from a defeat that is associated with the superior instruments of power of an industrialized victor. At the same time the pursuit of modernizations military component can have the limited purpose of creating security through power. Thus total victory or retaliation can be but need not be a goal. If it is avoided progress will be thanks to the savings faster than when militarization as in the historical Russian and Soviet case is the principal purpose of advancement.
Russias forward policy implemented through the instruments of local thugs directed by her infiltrated agents expresses a frequent error. Moscow has opted for an upgraded authoritarianism. Its components are the communist tradition czarist precedents chauvinistic nativism and a national church. A reinforcing addition is the Angst" of the future by elements that do not comprehend the modern world. Additionally these are threatened by structural change which implies their redundancy because their skills are reflecting Soviet backwardness antiquated. Kleptocracy and incompetence wrapped into the phobia of a hostile world that can only be contained if it is dominated hinder social political and economic modernization. If so the ruler can establish legitimacy by the display of military might.
Post Soviet times have warped the self-perception of what ex-Soviet subjects enjoyed during that era as a compensation for deprivation; shareholder status in a hegemony. Putin expressed this loss when he called the dissolution of the USSR a geopolitical catastrophe". Such considerations make the restoration of old greatness and of dignity through might understandable strivings.
To avoid misunderstandings is important to a Russophile. A modern and self-confident Russia is in Europes interest. Especially so if one has as does this writer a central European background. There cannot be a stable European or global order without Russias support. That countrys real interests need to be served.
The hurt pride of those who are blind to their new chances for personal advancement take consolation in the pursuit of empire and territorial recovery. This endeavor of those that reject the feared future also receives support from the outside. It is the product of a vacuum where the resistance to Soviet restoration should and could come from.
A factor that eggs on a skillfully calculating Putin originates in an element of Western thinking. Our culture has an inclination that firmed once the era of eternal peace was proclaimed; when the cold war ended. We are suffering from a habit of conflict cosmetics which supposes that challenges are overcome by denying them. An example is a recently publicized action of Clintons State Department. America kept Boko Haram off her terrorist list in the hope that it will make that gang mend its ways.
Another nice example for denial as well as of the ingenuity to bring up understanding" for anything and everything is a Merkel quote (14/05). She limited the participation of the separatists in the negotiation about the Ukraines future to those that could convincingly" prove that they do not pursue their goals through violence. No violence should be applied to solve problems she stated. Now then without the effective injection of violence there would be no separatism no escalation and no negotiation. Therefore the precondition is a synthetic one that exploits diplomacy to overlook the facts of the case.
Europe has currently only a few ways to respond to the challengers of her order. Due to neglect NATO lacks the means to resist even small foes. This and the respect lost means that she does not deter incursions before they occur. (That happens to be the main utility of armies.) As a result the alliance fights" aggression by finding explanations to tolerate it and to remain inactive. The upshot of invoking understanding" is to move from there to support through the tolerance of the intolerable. In its current condition Europe finds it easier to proclaim a bearded drag queen as the winner of a talent show than to face a bearded Islamist or a Kalashnikov-swinging unshaven Ukrainian separatist.
Americas indirect contribution to this climate in which violence rules is not negligible. Yes" we have heard that we can." One is still waiting for what that might be. Outstanding among the letdowns is the famous whisper to Medvedev to tell Vladimir" that after the election there can be more flexibility". The American public ignored it and went on to reelect the whisperer. Unintended but not surprising: that signal has been registered as a blank check of concessions.
The discrepancies of Western policy mislead Moscow. When in disarray and seemingly weak NATO has expanded into countries that did not need formal membership. When assertive the concern seems to be the manufacture of excuses that pave the way of retreat. It is a hope that regardless Russia will find a working balance. It will be equilibrium between her short-term muscle flexing possibilities that cater to a gut feeling and her cerebrally defined long-term strategic interests. These are those of a dignified status-quo and satiated great power. Such an entity once at peace with itself can find security within the consensual framework of a universally accepted procedural order secured by a balance of power.
When the glorious past" attracts in the bleak present.
A madness thought to be banished into the sealed coffin of bygone times is reemerging. The returning Dracula threatens the destruction of the procedural order that preventively canalizes conflicts among advanced nations. Some of the discord has roots in the communist pasts refurbished Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty. The remainder is contributed by the resurrected components of vintage czarist imperialism. In international relations the aggressive empire building assumed mummified for good is again reemerging. The Russian successor to the Soviet state pursues the tradition of conquest bequeathed by the Romanovs.
Recent events suggest a disturbing diagnosis. In the case of Putinism - to Russias ultimate detriment - territorial restoration is enlisted to serve an economically underdeveloped and politically retrograde system. Power conquest and collective pride are exploited as an ersatz" for democracy progress and material well-being. Instead of addressing itself to modernization Moscow seeks domestic popularity by relying on the sole yardstick by which it ranks as a top nation".
Some modernizers operate in a national context that produces good cultural learners. These are able to emulate and adapt advanced systems without feeling humiliated. If this is the case the pressing task of catching" up is disconnected from shame" and the fear of a lost national identity. In these instances the purpose of upgrading is not the upper hand in an anticipated military confrontation between teacher" and pupil".
Here realism requires an amendment. It acknowledges that the impulse for modernization tends to come from a defeat that is associated with the superior instruments of power of an industrialized victor. At the same time the pursuit of modernizations military component can have the limited purpose of creating security through power. Thus total victory or retaliation can be but need not be a goal. If it is avoided progress will be thanks to the savings faster than when militarization as in the historical Russian and Soviet case is the principal purpose of advancement.
Russias forward policy implemented through the instruments of local thugs directed by her infiltrated agents expresses a frequent error. Moscow has opted for an upgraded authoritarianism. Its components are the communist tradition czarist precedents chauvinistic nativism and a national church. A reinforcing addition is the Angst" of the future by elements that do not comprehend the modern world. Additionally these are threatened by structural change which implies their redundancy because their skills are reflecting Soviet backwardness antiquated. Kleptocracy and incompetence wrapped into the phobia of a hostile world that can only be contained if it is dominated hinder social political and economic modernization. If so the ruler can establish legitimacy by the display of military might.
Post Soviet times have warped the self-perception of what ex-Soviet subjects enjoyed during that era as a compensation for deprivation; shareholder status in a hegemony. Putin expressed this loss when he called the dissolution of the USSR a geopolitical catastrophe". Such considerations make the restoration of old greatness and of dignity through might understandable strivings.
To avoid misunderstandings is important to a Russophile. A modern and self-confident Russia is in Europes interest. Especially so if one has as does this writer a central European background. There cannot be a stable European or global order without Russias support. That countrys real interests need to be served.
The hurt pride of those who are blind to their new chances for personal advancement take consolation in the pursuit of empire and territorial recovery. This endeavor of those that reject the feared future also receives support from the outside. It is the product of a vacuum where the resistance to Soviet restoration should and could come from.
A factor that eggs on a skillfully calculating Putin originates in an element of Western thinking. Our culture has an inclination that firmed once the era of eternal peace was proclaimed; when the cold war ended. We are suffering from a habit of conflict cosmetics which supposes that challenges are overcome by denying them. An example is a recently publicized action of Clintons State Department. America kept Boko Haram off her terrorist list in the hope that it will make that gang mend its ways.
Another nice example for denial as well as of the ingenuity to bring up understanding" for anything and everything is a Merkel quote (14/05). She limited the participation of the separatists in the negotiation about the Ukraines future to those that could convincingly" prove that they do not pursue their goals through violence. No violence should be applied to solve problems she stated. Now then without the effective injection of violence there would be no separatism no escalation and no negotiation. Therefore the precondition is a synthetic one that exploits diplomacy to overlook the facts of the case.
Europe has currently only a few ways to respond to the challengers of her order. Due to neglect NATO lacks the means to resist even small foes. This and the respect lost means that she does not deter incursions before they occur. (That happens to be the main utility of armies.) As a result the alliance fights" aggression by finding explanations to tolerate it and to remain inactive. The upshot of invoking understanding" is to move from there to support through the tolerance of the intolerable. In its current condition Europe finds it easier to proclaim a bearded drag queen as the winner of a talent show than to face a bearded Islamist or a Kalashnikov-swinging unshaven Ukrainian separatist.
Americas indirect contribution to this climate in which violence rules is not negligible. Yes" we have heard that we can." One is still waiting for what that might be. Outstanding among the letdowns is the famous whisper to Medvedev to tell Vladimir" that after the election there can be more flexibility". The American public ignored it and went on to reelect the whisperer. Unintended but not surprising: that signal has been registered as a blank check of concessions.
The discrepancies of Western policy mislead Moscow. When in disarray and seemingly weak NATO has expanded into countries that did not need formal membership. When assertive the concern seems to be the manufacture of excuses that pave the way of retreat. It is a hope that regardless Russia will find a working balance. It will be equilibrium between her short-term muscle flexing possibilities that cater to a gut feeling and her cerebrally defined long-term strategic interests. These are those of a dignified status-quo and satiated great power. Such an entity once at peace with itself can find security within the consensual framework of a universally accepted procedural order secured by a balance of power.