Preamble
Lately the political discourse has been enriched with new debate topics about the role of NATO in the years to come. One topic based on a more pragmatic perspective of the United States deals with a review of the U.S. obligation to protect the allies who do not fulfill their financial obligations as NATO members (e.g. have defense budgets under a pre-established approved quota).
Another topic deals with the viability of the same U.S. obligation to military protect some non-NATO countries (like Japan South Korea Saudi Arabia) who have either limited defense budgets or number of troops incapable to react if the United States were to be attacked.
Last but not least another concern relates to the NATO future architecture after the Brexit and the practicality (or lack thereof) of the European Union to have some parallel military structures with no or little U.S. contribution.
All these legitimate issues make us revisit the latest directions of action taken recently by the NATO allies during their last summit in Warsaw.
These directions have impact not only for the Northern Atlantic region but given the latest challenges posed by international terrorism and the various local wars almost in equal measure to the Mediterranean and Caucasus Northern Africa the Near and Middle East the Caribbean and the Pacific areas.
1. From the Warsaw Pact 1955 to the Warsaw NATO Summit 2016
Between July 8 and 9 2016 Polands capital hosted the last NATO summit. It is a little ironic if not downright surprising that after more than six decades the tables are now turned: A NATO meeting taking place in the very Eastern European city which used to be the military headquarters of the anti-NATO former communist bloc.
Initially on May 14 1955 the Warsaw Pact had been created and designed in reaction to the integration in the same year of West Germany into NATO (which was created earlier in 1949) and also as a tool of maintaining control and dominance of Central and Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.
However a longitudinal analysis of the Pact (from May 14 1955 to July 1 1991) shows two interesting facts. First the Warsaw Pact and NATO never directly waged war against each other in Europe (although the US and the USSR with their allies worked and fought constantly for influence within the Cold War period both in Europe and on the international arena. Second the most notable military operations of the Warsaw Pact were in fact directed against its own allied countries.
Indeed the Pact has a long and constant history of punishing its own member states that showed signs of defection from an organization whose goal was to fight the common enemy that the United States Canada and Western Europe were supposed to represent. Soviet troops invaded Hungary (in1956) and backed up by armed forces of other member countries Czechoslovakia (in 1968) removing the local governments of these countries who announced they would withdraw from the Pact. Romania and Albania did not participate with troops in the invasion of Czechoslovakia criticizing the Moscows move (Albania formally withdrew from the Pact in the same year). However when a violent anti-communist revolution erupted in Romania in December 1989 there was no military intervention from the Warsaw Pact member states which marked the de facto disbanding of this organization.
On February 25 1991 in Budapest Hungary at a meeting of defense and foreign ministers from the remaining Pact countries (Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Romania and the Soviet Union) the Warsaw Pact was declared disbanded. The Pact was finally dissolved on July 1 1991.
The event was followed by the Soviet Union disestablishment in December 1991 and the NATO joining between 1999 and 2009 of Czech Republic Hungary and Poland (in March 1999) Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia and Slovenia (in March 2004) Albania and Croatia (in April 2009).
2. Directions of action
On July 9 2016 the Summit adopted a series of key documents outlining the NATOs main directions of action in the period to come related to: the final statement (called Communiqu) the European Union Ukraine Georgia Afghanistan cyber defense and protection of civilians plus two novel documents related to Transatlantic security and commitment to enhance resilience.
The meeting in interoperability format at the level of Defense Ministers did not have a final document.
The Warsaw Summit Communiqu is a 139-article document presenting some important points related (but not limited) to: Eastern Europe the Mediterranean and Caucasus regions; Northern Africa the Near and Middle East regions; and some strategies of improving the NATO policies.
2.1. Eastern Europe the Mediterranean and Caucasus regions
These regions being the initial zones of the NATO interoperability actions have been granted special attention substantiated among others in measures related to:
(2.1.1.) Inviting Montenegro to join the Alliance as the 29th NATO member a move that blocks a possible Russian corridor (through Serbia) toward the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (Art. 1);
(2.1.2.) Acknowledging Russias aggressive actions which are a source of regional instability (Art. 5);
(2.1.3.) Declaring support for Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders (Art. 16);
(2.1.4.) Developing partnership relations with Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea region with Georgia and Ukraine in the Black Sea region and strengthening the maritime posture and comprehensive situational awareness in the North Atlantic as well as in the Mediterranean Sea (Art. 23);
(2.1.5.) Establishing in early 2017 four battalion-sized battle groups that is 4000 troops -- that can operate in concert with national forces present at all times in Estonia Latvia Lithuania and Poland with Canada Germany the United Kingdom and the United States to serve as framework nations for the robust multinational presence in these aforementioned countries (Art. 40);
(2.1.6.) Establishing a multinational framework brigade under Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast in Romania tailored to the Black Sea region (Art. 41);
(2.1.7.) Declaring the achievement of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Initial Operational Capability (Art. 57).
This offers a stronger capability to defend the populations territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack. It includes: the forward deployment of BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota (Spain); the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu (Romania); a forward-based early warning BMD radar at Krecik (Turkey); and an Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base (Poland). By 2018 when the missile shield bases in Romania and Poland are fully operational this defensive umbrella will cover the area from Greenland to the Azores.
(2.1.8.) Providing support to the development of Georgias defense capabilities needed to implement the Substantial Package which helps Georgia advance in its preparations for the NATO membership (Art. 112). This reiterates the Alliances decision made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest (Romania).
2.2. Northern Africa the Near and Middle East regions
These regions germane for the fight against Islamic terrorism have been allocated a series of measures which on the NATO behalf includes:
(2.2.1.) Committing to ensure long-term security and stability in Afghanistan by sustaining the Resolute Support mission beyond 2016 including until the end of 2020 through a flexible regional model to continue to deliver training advice assistance and financial sustainment to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (Art. 86);
(2.2.2.) Agreeing in principle to enhance the Alliances contribution to the efforts of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS/ISIL by providing direct NATO support to increase the coalitions situational awareness (Art. 96). However this contribution to the Global Coalition does not make NATO a member of this coalition.
(2.2.3.) Developing partnerships with countries of the Middle East and North Africa regions through deeper political dialog and enhanced practical cooperation (Arts. 103-104).
Such partnership frameworks include The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) through which NATO provides assistance to eleven partner countries in the region to help them modernize their defense establishments and military forces (Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Mauritania Morocco Tunisia for the MD and Bahrain Kuwait Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for the ICI).
2.3. Strategies of improving the NATO policies
NATO is facing a new world with new challenges. During the Summit there were expressed concerns vis--vis the NATO relations with the EU and its strategies regarding emerging technologies and their applicability in the military domain.
Only five of the current 28 member states meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2 of their Gross Domestic Product on defense (Art. 34).
The NATO Secretary General the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission issued a joint declaration in Warsaw which outlines a series of actions the two organizations NATO and the EU intent to take together in concrete areas including countering hybrid threats enhancing resilience defense capacity building cyber defense maritime security and exercises (Art. 122).
NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense which will foster an equitable sharing of the burden benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership (Art. 124).
In the fight against terrorism NATO will continue to improve capabilities and technologies including defending against improvised explosive devices and chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats and enhance cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters (Art. 134).
For acquiring NATO capabilities a stronger defense industry across the Alliance remains essential. This includes small- and medium-sized enterprises greater defense industrial and technological cooperation across the Atlantic and within Europe and a robust industrial base in the whole of Europe and North America (Art. 136).
It was decided that the next meeting would be held in 2017 at the new NATO Headquarters in Brussels.
3. Odd allies
It was expected that after Russias land invasions in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008) Ukraine (Crimea in 2014) and air space violations in Norway (in 2015) the Baltic nations and Turkey (in 2016) NATO would come in stronger terms in communicating with this country. And indeed the Communiqu contains formulas likely to suggest that until Russias actions do not demonstrate compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities there cannot be a NATO return to business as usual."
Yet France and Germany have acted one more time as odd allies in a visible and disturbing discrepancy to the approaches coming from the U.S. the NATO Secretary General and the other member states.
Thus the then-French president Franois Hollande adopting a lamentable dovish attitude insisted that Russia is a partner" not a threat."
Moreover he insisted that NATO has no role at all to be saying what Europes relations with Russia should be. For France Russia is not an adversary not a threat."
This stance has not remained without practical consequences. France insisted that the U.S. be removed from the coordination of the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu Romania although the U.S. built the European missile-defense system and the command and control be transferred to NATO (see Art. 57).
In addition another compromise was made by deploying the four battalion-sized battle groups in the Baltic States and Poland on a rotational not permanent basis (see Art. 40).
On the other hand both the German and French foreign ministers Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Jean-Marc Ayrault insisted on the argument that Europe should strengthen its defense role creating irritation and worries to the U.S. and Canada who fear that Europe would duplicate the NATO military structures.
In order to counter-balance the anti-productive positions of the French and the Germans the NATO Secretary General the Norwegian Jens Stoltenberg felt complied to clarify that the Alliance should stand together" and have a homogeneous policy on Russia. He distanced himself from Hollandes position saying that at this moment NATO is in an entirely new situation: We are not in the strategic partnership with Russia … but we are neither in a Cold War situation" and that we are in a new situation which is different to anything else we have experienced before."
With enemies like Hollande and Steinmeier who needs friends for Putins Russia?
4. Impact of the Warsaw NATO Summit for the United States
For the U.S. in general and the former President Barack Obama in particular the Summit meant a limited success. The limited success consists of:
(4.1.) Deploying a U.S. armored brigade of 1000 troops in Poland in 2017 to strengthen the NATOs Eastern flank. This is considered the most important moment for the Alliance since the end of the Cold War.
(4.2.) Deploying in addition three rotational not permanent NATO battalions on the Eastern flank close to the Baltic Sea in the Baltic states of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania. The United Kingdom Germany and Canada will coordinate these battalions and will send around 500 troops for the battalions under their command. This is regarded as the largest dislocation of troops NATO had had since its inception in 1949. Some skeptics have considered this an unjustifiable measure and as a symbolic gesture offered by the major member of the Alliance namely the United States to its smaller East European allies.
This is not the case. There are far fewer reasons to believe that Russia who did not attack NATO when it had seven (later six) Warsaw Pact allies for the whole duration of the Pact would do it now when all its former allies (small indeed but very determined) have switched sides.
(4.3.) Inviting Romania to coordinate a multinational battalion consisting of 1000 Romanians 500 Bulgarians and 500 multinational troops on the Southern flank close to the Black Sea (as a result of the talks between the Alliance and the Romanian President Klaus Iohannis).
(4.4.) Admitting Montenegro as the NATOs 29th member. Montenegro tiny as it is and in spite of some skeptics opinions secures the junction on the Adriatic Sea coast between the other two NATO recent members Albania and Croatia (full members since April 1 2009 after they were invited to join at the 2008 Bucharest Summit). Montenegro blocks effectively Russias access through Serbia -- to the Mediterranean Sea.
(4.5.) Implementing a plan sustaining Ukraine.
(4.6.) Continuing the supply to Afghanistan where NATO retains a component of training and security.
(4.7.) Issuing a NATO E.U. joint declaration on security cooperation in the fields of hybrid warfare cyber warfare and joint maritime operations to prevent illegal migration where the United States is equally interested.
5. NATO and the Caribbean region
If one cannot see the connection between the powerful military organization and the Caribbean think no further than the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In late March and April 2006 the Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG-1) one out of four of NATOs maritime groups engaged in presence operations around the Caribbean Sea.
It was the first time NATO has ever deployed for presence operations to the Caribbean.
These operations are designed to build maritime situational awareness and demonstrate NATOs capability to deploy and sustain forces at strategic distances. Training exercises (including anti-submarine anti-air and anti-surface warfare exercises) have been used as evaluation exercises for military missions in Northern Europe (e.g. the Noble Mariner evaluation exercise).
There have been also humanitarian missions including tasks to do assistance missions with ships that provide doctors and nurses as a non-government support in disaster areas or provide security so the crew could safely go ashore to help or provide medical water and food support for small towns in the area. In other circumstances supply ships (like the British ship Wave Ruler part of the SNMG-1) are prepared to evacuate people in case of volcano eruptions (like in the case of the Soufrire Hills volcano on the island of Montserrat).
While some might consider the Caribbean still an American lake" in the spirit of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and consequently a war free-risk zone it is not only the military component that may help the region prosper.
James Stavridis a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (2009-2013) and commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Miami Florida (which he called the true capital of the Caribbean and Latin America") proposed several directions of actions for the U.S. regarding the Caribbean Sea and basin.
These directions include: building local partnerships through economic political cultural and security cooperation; revitalizing the Caribbean Basin Initiative with the focus on collective action; involving the U.S. Southern Command in training local forces and providing resources to improve the rule of law basic investigative work advanced anti-corruption techniques surveillance intelligence and human rights; and not limiting on the war on drugs."
Another set of directions may include: bringing together the diasporas from the regions living in the U.S. today for resources and business experience (the Cuban-American community the Puerto Rico and the Caribbean diasporas); inter-cooperation with the continental partners of Canada and Mexico; developing a collective Caribbean strategy in cooperation with the U.S. federal agencies; last but not least developing the so-called track two" diplomacy by coupling private sectors together through educational reforms programs in the arts sport diplomacy and medical exchanges (e.g. a series of baseball clinics conducted by the U.S. troops and financed partly through public sector donations from Major League Baseball teams). For more details see his article on How Captain Jack Sparrow Explains the Problem with Americas Backyard published in Foreign Policy on February 1 2016.
6. Post-NATO Summit Challenges
The Warsaw NATO Summit 2016 was the former President Obamas last NATO summit and his last trip to Europe before his second mandate ended in January 2017.
The aforementioned limited success was overshadowed by the tragic events on the domestic front in Dallas Texas where on July 9 2016 the last day of the Warsaw Summit five police officers were killed during a protest demonstration by an angry African-American sniper a military veteran who had served in Afghanistan.
Later in 2016 other NATO allies were confronted with attacks committed by Muslim citizens residents or refugees of those respective countries like France (shooting and vehicle ramming by a Tunisian - July 14 the French National Day) Germany (axe attack in train by an Afghan in Wrtzburg - July 18; shooting by an Iranian in Munich - July 22; suicide bombing by a Syrian in Ansbach -- July 24; machete attack by a Syrian in Reutlingen - July 24) and Belgium (machete attack on police officers by an Algerian in Charleroi - August 6).
In addition on July 15 to 16 2016 an unsuccessful coup dtat took place in Turkey another NATO major ally as a reflection of the fundamental division that exists in the Turkish society of today between secularists (some within the countrys top military brass) and Islamists (including President Recep Erdogans AKP party). As a result the southern Turkey Incirlik air base used by the U.S. was temporarily closed.
On the other hand on August 4 2016 Russia displaying again its aggression acts aimed to check the NATO reaction capabilities deployed - for an anti-terrorist exercise on the Nistru river - an armed forces operational group in the Republic of Moldovas secessionist region of Transnistria close to Romania a NATO member.
In a more worrying initiative on August 9 2016 Turkish president Erdogan met president Putin in Saint Petersburg Russia in order to restore relations and discuss issues of military cooperation.
All these post-NATO summit events demonstrated once more how fast an organization like NATO needs to reform itself in order to be able to respond effectively to the increasing number of military and terrorist related events organized by groups of a radical Islamist inspiration.
NOTE - A version of the article was published previously in PUERTO RICO MONITOR.
Tiberiu Dianu has published several books and a host of articles in law politics and post-communist societies. He currently lives and works in Washington DC and can be followed on MEDIUM.
*****
Preamble
Lately the political discourse has been enriched with new debate topics about the role of NATO in the years to come. One topic based on a more pragmatic perspective of the United States deals with a review of the U.S. obligation to protect the allies who do not fulfill their financial obligations as NATO members (e.g. have defense budgets under a pre-established approved quota).
Another topic deals with the viability of the same U.S. obligation to military protect some non-NATO countries (like Japan South Korea Saudi Arabia) who have either limited defense budgets or number of troops incapable to react if the United States were to be attacked.
Last but not least another concern relates to the NATO future architecture after the Brexit and the practicality (or lack thereof) of the European Union to have some parallel military structures with no or little U.S. contribution.
All these legitimate issues make us revisit the latest directions of action taken recently by the NATO allies during their last summit in Warsaw.
These directions have impact not only for the Northern Atlantic region but given the latest challenges posed by international terrorism and the various local wars almost in equal measure to the Mediterranean and Caucasus Northern Africa the Near and Middle East the Caribbean and the Pacific areas.
1. From the Warsaw Pact 1955 to the Warsaw NATO Summit 2016
Between July 8 and 9 2016 Polands capital hosted the last NATO summit. It is a little ironic if not downright surprising that after more than six decades the tables are now turned: A NATO meeting taking place in the very Eastern European city which used to be the military headquarters of the anti-NATO former communist bloc.
Initially on May 14 1955 the Warsaw Pact had been created and designed in reaction to the integration in the same year of West Germany into NATO (which was created earlier in 1949) and also as a tool of maintaining control and dominance of Central and Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.
However a longitudinal analysis of the Pact (from May 14 1955 to July 1 1991) shows two interesting facts. First the Warsaw Pact and NATO never directly waged war against each other in Europe (although the US and the USSR with their allies worked and fought constantly for influence within the Cold War period both in Europe and on the international arena. Second the most notable military operations of the Warsaw Pact were in fact directed against its own allied countries.
Indeed the Pact has a long and constant history of punishing its own member states that showed signs of defection from an organization whose goal was to fight the common enemy that the United States Canada and Western Europe were supposed to represent. Soviet troops invaded Hungary (in1956) and backed up by armed forces of other member countries Czechoslovakia (in 1968) removing the local governments of these countries who announced they would withdraw from the Pact. Romania and Albania did not participate with troops in the invasion of Czechoslovakia criticizing the Moscows move (Albania formally withdrew from the Pact in the same year). However when a violent anti-communist revolution erupted in Romania in December 1989 there was no military intervention from the Warsaw Pact member states which marked the de facto disbanding of this organization.
On February 25 1991 in Budapest Hungary at a meeting of defense and foreign ministers from the remaining Pact countries (Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Romania and the Soviet Union) the Warsaw Pact was declared disbanded. The Pact was finally dissolved on July 1 1991.
The event was followed by the Soviet Union disestablishment in December 1991 and the NATO joining between 1999 and 2009 of Czech Republic Hungary and Poland (in March 1999) Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia and Slovenia (in March 2004) Albania and Croatia (in April 2009).
2. Directions of action
On July 9 2016 the Summit adopted a series of key documents outlining the NATOs main directions of action in the period to come related to: the final statement (called Communiqu) the European Union Ukraine Georgia Afghanistan cyber defense and protection of civilians plus two novel documents related to Transatlantic security and commitment to enhance resilience.
The meeting in interoperability format at the level of Defense Ministers did not have a final document.
The Warsaw Summit Communiqu is a 139-article document presenting some important points related (but not limited) to: Eastern Europe the Mediterranean and Caucasus regions; Northern Africa the Near and Middle East regions; and some strategies of improving the NATO policies.
2.1. Eastern Europe the Mediterranean and Caucasus regions
These regions being the initial zones of the NATO interoperability actions have been granted special attention substantiated among others in measures related to:
(2.1.1.) Inviting Montenegro to join the Alliance as the 29th NATO member a move that blocks a possible Russian corridor (through Serbia) toward the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea (Art. 1);
(2.1.2.) Acknowledging Russias aggressive actions which are a source of regional instability (Art. 5);
(2.1.3.) Declaring support for Ukraines sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders (Art. 16);
(2.1.4.) Developing partnership relations with Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea region with Georgia and Ukraine in the Black Sea region and strengthening the maritime posture and comprehensive situational awareness in the North Atlantic as well as in the Mediterranean Sea (Art. 23);
(2.1.5.) Establishing in early 2017 four battalion-sized battle groups that is 4000 troops -- that can operate in concert with national forces present at all times in Estonia Latvia Lithuania and Poland with Canada Germany the United Kingdom and the United States to serve as framework nations for the robust multinational presence in these aforementioned countries (Art. 40);
(2.1.6.) Establishing a multinational framework brigade under Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast in Romania tailored to the Black Sea region (Art. 41);
(2.1.7.) Declaring the achievement of the NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Initial Operational Capability (Art. 57).
This offers a stronger capability to defend the populations territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a potential ballistic missile attack. It includes: the forward deployment of BMD-capable Aegis ships to Rota (Spain); the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu (Romania); a forward-based early warning BMD radar at Krecik (Turkey); and an Aegis Ashore site at the Redzikowo military base (Poland). By 2018 when the missile shield bases in Romania and Poland are fully operational this defensive umbrella will cover the area from Greenland to the Azores.
(2.1.8.) Providing support to the development of Georgias defense capabilities needed to implement the Substantial Package which helps Georgia advance in its preparations for the NATO membership (Art. 112). This reiterates the Alliances decision made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest (Romania).
2.2. Northern Africa the Near and Middle East regions
These regions germane for the fight against Islamic terrorism have been allocated a series of measures which on the NATO behalf includes:
(2.2.1.) Committing to ensure long-term security and stability in Afghanistan by sustaining the Resolute Support mission beyond 2016 including until the end of 2020 through a flexible regional model to continue to deliver training advice assistance and financial sustainment to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (Art. 86);
(2.2.2.) Agreeing in principle to enhance the Alliances contribution to the efforts of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS/ISIL by providing direct NATO support to increase the coalitions situational awareness (Art. 96). However this contribution to the Global Coalition does not make NATO a member of this coalition.
(2.2.3.) Developing partnerships with countries of the Middle East and North Africa regions through deeper political dialog and enhanced practical cooperation (Arts. 103-104).
Such partnership frameworks include The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) through which NATO provides assistance to eleven partner countries in the region to help them modernize their defense establishments and military forces (Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Mauritania Morocco Tunisia for the MD and Bahrain Kuwait Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for the ICI).
2.3. Strategies of improving the NATO policies
NATO is facing a new world with new challenges. During the Summit there were expressed concerns vis--vis the NATO relations with the EU and its strategies regarding emerging technologies and their applicability in the military domain.
Only five of the current 28 member states meet the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2 of their Gross Domestic Product on defense (Art. 34).
The NATO Secretary General the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission issued a joint declaration in Warsaw which outlines a series of actions the two organizations NATO and the EU intent to take together in concrete areas including countering hybrid threats enhancing resilience defense capacity building cyber defense maritime security and exercises (Art. 122).
NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense which will foster an equitable sharing of the burden benefits and responsibilities of Alliance membership (Art. 124).
In the fight against terrorism NATO will continue to improve capabilities and technologies including defending against improvised explosive devices and chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats and enhance cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters (Art. 134).
For acquiring NATO capabilities a stronger defense industry across the Alliance remains essential. This includes small- and medium-sized enterprises greater defense industrial and technological cooperation across the Atlantic and within Europe and a robust industrial base in the whole of Europe and North America (Art. 136).
It was decided that the next meeting would be held in 2017 at the new NATO Headquarters in Brussels.
3. Odd allies
It was expected that after Russias land invasions in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008) Ukraine (Crimea in 2014) and air space violations in Norway (in 2015) the Baltic nations and Turkey (in 2016) NATO would come in stronger terms in communicating with this country. And indeed the Communiqu contains formulas likely to suggest that until Russias actions do not demonstrate compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities there cannot be a NATO return to business as usual."
Yet France and Germany have acted one more time as odd allies in a visible and disturbing discrepancy to the approaches coming from the U.S. the NATO Secretary General and the other member states.
Thus the then-French president Franois Hollande adopting a lamentable dovish attitude insisted that Russia is a partner" not a threat."
Moreover he insisted that NATO has no role at all to be saying what Europes relations with Russia should be. For France Russia is not an adversary not a threat."
This stance has not remained without practical consequences. France insisted that the U.S. be removed from the coordination of the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu Romania although the U.S. built the European missile-defense system and the command and control be transferred to NATO (see Art. 57).
In addition another compromise was made by deploying the four battalion-sized battle groups in the Baltic States and Poland on a rotational not permanent basis (see Art. 40).
On the other hand both the German and French foreign ministers Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Jean-Marc Ayrault insisted on the argument that Europe should strengthen its defense role creating irritation and worries to the U.S. and Canada who fear that Europe would duplicate the NATO military structures.
In order to counter-balance the anti-productive positions of the French and the Germans the NATO Secretary General the Norwegian Jens Stoltenberg felt complied to clarify that the Alliance should stand together" and have a homogeneous policy on Russia. He distanced himself from Hollandes position saying that at this moment NATO is in an entirely new situation: We are not in the strategic partnership with Russia … but we are neither in a Cold War situation" and that we are in a new situation which is different to anything else we have experienced before."
With enemies like Hollande and Steinmeier who needs friends for Putins Russia?
4. Impact of the Warsaw NATO Summit for the United States
For the U.S. in general and the former President Barack Obama in particular the Summit meant a limited success. The limited success consists of:
(4.1.) Deploying a U.S. armored brigade of 1000 troops in Poland in 2017 to strengthen the NATOs Eastern flank. This is considered the most important moment for the Alliance since the end of the Cold War.
(4.2.) Deploying in addition three rotational not permanent NATO battalions on the Eastern flank close to the Baltic Sea in the Baltic states of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania. The United Kingdom Germany and Canada will coordinate these battalions and will send around 500 troops for the battalions under their command. This is regarded as the largest dislocation of troops NATO had had since its inception in 1949. Some skeptics have considered this an unjustifiable measure and as a symbolic gesture offered by the major member of the Alliance namely the United States to its smaller East European allies.
This is not the case. There are far fewer reasons to believe that Russia who did not attack NATO when it had seven (later six) Warsaw Pact allies for the whole duration of the Pact would do it now when all its former allies (small indeed but very determined) have switched sides.
(4.3.) Inviting Romania to coordinate a multinational battalion consisting of 1000 Romanians 500 Bulgarians and 500 multinational troops on the Southern flank close to the Black Sea (as a result of the talks between the Alliance and the Romanian President Klaus Iohannis).
(4.4.) Admitting Montenegro as the NATOs 29th member. Montenegro tiny as it is and in spite of some skeptics opinions secures the junction on the Adriatic Sea coast between the other two NATO recent members Albania and Croatia (full members since April 1 2009 after they were invited to join at the 2008 Bucharest Summit). Montenegro blocks effectively Russias access through Serbia -- to the Mediterranean Sea.
(4.5.) Implementing a plan sustaining Ukraine.
(4.6.) Continuing the supply to Afghanistan where NATO retains a component of training and security.
(4.7.) Issuing a NATO E.U. joint declaration on security cooperation in the fields of hybrid warfare cyber warfare and joint maritime operations to prevent illegal migration where the United States is equally interested.
5. NATO and the Caribbean region
If one cannot see the connection between the powerful military organization and the Caribbean think no further than the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In late March and April 2006 the Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG-1) one out of four of NATOs maritime groups engaged in presence operations around the Caribbean Sea.
It was the first time NATO has ever deployed for presence operations to the Caribbean.
These operations are designed to build maritime situational awareness and demonstrate NATOs capability to deploy and sustain forces at strategic distances. Training exercises (including anti-submarine anti-air and anti-surface warfare exercises) have been used as evaluation exercises for military missions in Northern Europe (e.g. the Noble Mariner evaluation exercise).
There have been also humanitarian missions including tasks to do assistance missions with ships that provide doctors and nurses as a non-government support in disaster areas or provide security so the crew could safely go ashore to help or provide medical water and food support for small towns in the area. In other circumstances supply ships (like the British ship Wave Ruler part of the SNMG-1) are prepared to evacuate people in case of volcano eruptions (like in the case of the Soufrire Hills volcano on the island of Montserrat).
While some might consider the Caribbean still an American lake" in the spirit of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine and consequently a war free-risk zone it is not only the military component that may help the region prosper.
James Stavridis a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (2009-2013) and commander of the U.S. Southern Command in Miami Florida (which he called the true capital of the Caribbean and Latin America") proposed several directions of actions for the U.S. regarding the Caribbean Sea and basin.
These directions include: building local partnerships through economic political cultural and security cooperation; revitalizing the Caribbean Basin Initiative with the focus on collective action; involving the U.S. Southern Command in training local forces and providing resources to improve the rule of law basic investigative work advanced anti-corruption techniques surveillance intelligence and human rights; and not limiting on the war on drugs."
Another set of directions may include: bringing together the diasporas from the regions living in the U.S. today for resources and business experience (the Cuban-American community the Puerto Rico and the Caribbean diasporas); inter-cooperation with the continental partners of Canada and Mexico; developing a collective Caribbean strategy in cooperation with the U.S. federal agencies; last but not least developing the so-called track two" diplomacy by coupling private sectors together through educational reforms programs in the arts sport diplomacy and medical exchanges (e.g. a series of baseball clinics conducted by the U.S. troops and financed partly through public sector donations from Major League Baseball teams). For more details see his article on How Captain Jack Sparrow Explains the Problem with Americas Backyard published in Foreign Policy on February 1 2016.
6. Post-NATO Summit Challenges
The Warsaw NATO Summit 2016 was the former President Obamas last NATO summit and his last trip to Europe before his second mandate ended in January 2017.
The aforementioned limited success was overshadowed by the tragic events on the domestic front in Dallas Texas where on July 9 2016 the last day of the Warsaw Summit five police officers were killed during a protest demonstration by an angry African-American sniper a military veteran who had served in Afghanistan.
Later in 2016 other NATO allies were confronted with attacks committed by Muslim citizens residents or refugees of those respective countries like France (shooting and vehicle ramming by a Tunisian - July 14 the French National Day) Germany (axe attack in train by an Afghan in Wrtzburg - July 18; shooting by an Iranian in Munich - July 22; suicide bombing by a Syrian in Ansbach -- July 24; machete attack by a Syrian in Reutlingen - July 24) and Belgium (machete attack on police officers by an Algerian in Charleroi - August 6).
In addition on July 15 to 16 2016 an unsuccessful coup dtat took place in Turkey another NATO major ally as a reflection of the fundamental division that exists in the Turkish society of today between secularists (some within the countrys top military brass) and Islamists (including President Recep Erdogans AKP party). As a result the southern Turkey Incirlik air base used by the U.S. was temporarily closed.
On the other hand on August 4 2016 Russia displaying again its aggression acts aimed to check the NATO reaction capabilities deployed - for an anti-terrorist exercise on the Nistru river - an armed forces operational group in the Republic of Moldovas secessionist region of Transnistria close to Romania a NATO member.
In a more worrying initiative on August 9 2016 Turkish president Erdogan met president Putin in Saint Petersburg Russia in order to restore relations and discuss issues of military cooperation.
All these post-NATO summit events demonstrated once more how fast an organization like NATO needs to reform itself in order to be able to respond effectively to the increasing number of military and terrorist related events organized by groups of a radical Islamist inspiration.
NOTE - A version of the article was published previously in PUERTO RICO MONITOR.
Tiberiu Dianu has published several books and a host of articles in law politics and post-communist societies. He currently lives and works in Washington DC and can be followed on MEDIUM.
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