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Locke's Illogical Attack on Animal Rights
by Robert H. Bass
07 July 2005
Since babies and others don't have reason or choice, but do have
rights, possession of reason and choice can't be necessary for rights. A response to Edwin Locke.
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In a recent op-ed,
Edwin Locke retreads his well-worn anti-animal-rights tirade to briefly mention
current events, such as the campaign by PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals) against the biomedical research firm, Covance.
Along the way, he manages to cram a lot of undocumented and unelaborated
charges into less than 700 words. That's a powerful tactic if you want to
discredit somebody -- tell enough lies or half-truths that nobody can pick
them apart in less than several thousand words and you can count on editors
not to let their columns be taken over by the debate. That puts the honest
debater at a disadvantage: in the space available, only a charge or two can
be rebutted, and the rest are left untouched. Observers are inevitably left
with the impression that there is no answer for the rest.
Rather than participate in the mud-slinging contest, I shall address just
two points. One is what has been going on at Covance. The other is the shaky
foundation of illogic upon which, Locke alleges, the entire animal rights
movement is built.
What's going on at Covance gets only the briefest of mentions. The reader
learns that the firm engages in animal testing and that PETA has launched
a campaign. Why? Locke does not tell you. Perhaps he doesn't want to encourage
curiosity. Perhaps he suspects that people would be upset if they knew. You
don't need to speculate about what you would think, though. You can find
out. Visit www.covancecruelty.com
and view the video footage. See for yourself how the monkeys are beaten,
caged and terrified. Apply Locke's own standard to it, "Of course, it is
proper not to cause animals gratuitous suffering," and ask yourself if the
kind of treatment you are observing is, by any stretch of the imagination,
not gratuitous. Watch the film and see if you can tell yourself that the
way the Covance animals are restrained, caged, beaten and terrified is all
necessary.
But Locke's principal complaint is about the illogic of the animal rights
movement: "I know firsthand that the whole movement is based on a single
-- invalid -- syllogism, namely: men feel pain and have rights; animals feel
pain; therefore, animals have rights." The only thing right here is that
it is an invalid syllogism, no better than 'bread is made from grain and
is good with jelly; rice is made from grain; so rice is good with jelly.'
As he says, this is invalid. So far, so good.
Where did he get the idea, though, that the whole animal rights movement
is based upon that syllogism? Consider Peter Singer's influential Animal Liberation,
which PETA's president has called one of the most important animal rights
books ever written. I'll bet Locke can't find his invalid syllogism endorsed
anywhere in its 300+ pages. Or look at Tom Regan's nearly-as-influential
Case for Animal Rights. Locke won't find his syllogism
there, either. Perhaps he overlooked Singer and Regan when he was trying
to identify what the whole movement is based upon? If so, he was terribly
careless.
I suspect something else is at work, though. Locke tells us that "man's rights
... depend on his ability to think" and that "Rights are ethical principles
applicable only to beings capable of reason and choice." What Locke doesn't
want you to ask is: What about the humans who cannot think, who are not capable
of reason and choice? That included all of us when we were babies. It includes
some of our fellow human beings throughout their lives. It will include some
of us as we age and succumb to Alzheimers' or senile dementia. Does he really
believe that none of these people have any rights? Apparently so, if rights
only apply to beings capable of reason and choice. The babies, the handicapped,
and the senile must be rightless. (Maybe, Locke thinks we should use them
in medical experiments!)
A different argument, which Locke would surely have found, had he looked
at Singer or Regan, is that since babies and the others don't have reason
or choice, but do have rights, possession of reason and choice can't be necessary
for rights. And if rights are not based on reason and choice, what good alternative
is there that will cover the babies and the rest but that will not also cover
many non-human animals? If anything deserves to be called the one argument
the animal rights movement is based upon, this is it. Most likely, that's
the reason Locke presented such a caricature of the animal rights movement:
He wasn't prepared to deal with the real arguments.
*****
Dr. Locke submitted this response to Professor Bass on July 19, 2005:
Robert
Bass has attacked my view that rights are based on reason, because of
the fact that newborrns have rights, as do the mentally infirm. I could
not cover this issue in a 700 word op-ed, but his argument does not
refute my position.
First, the concept of rights is based on the requirements for survival
in society of normal human adults. If only children and the mentally
infirm existed, the human race would become extinct. Thus we must
consider the appplications of the basic principle to other categories
of people (i.e., to special cases). Newborns are the growing form of
human adults; the capacity to reason does not emerge full grown at
birth but develops gradually. There can be no human rights if children
do not have the right to grow into adults, because then there would be
no humans. As to the infirm, many have some, though diminished,
reasoning ability. Further, some may recover, especially if new
treatments are discovered. Calling them sick humans does not turn them
into animals. Only when the brain is fully destroyed and the "person"
is in an irreversible vegetative state would rights no longer apply.
Mr.
Bass also says that I seem not to be acquainted with the work of Singer
and Regan. I have read both and refuted them in public talks. Regan,
for example, argues that all life is "intrisically valuable" but there
is no such thing as intrinsic value. Value pre-supposes an answer to
the questions: to whom and for what? Rabid dogs and poisonous
snakes, for example, are not of value to humans but rather a threat to
life. However, the animal rights argument has "evolved" over the years
and the pain argument seems now to be the most popular one -- which is
why I choose to focus on it, given my tight word limit.
Edwin A. Locke
July 19, 2005
*****
Dr. Bass submitted this response to Professor Locke on August 1, 2005:
I
had argued that reason can't be the necessary basis of rights because there
are many humans -- babies, the senile, the mentally incapacitated -- who
have rights but are lacking in reason. Edwin Locke responded that, "Newborns
are the growing form of human adults" who, if there are to be any human rights,
must have the right to grow into adults. As for the mentally handicapped,
many have limited reasoning ability and may recover if new treatments are
discovered.
Does Locke mean that babies and the mentally infirm have rights because they
are potentially reasoning beings? If so, there are considerable difficulties.
If the baby is the growing and potentially rational form of the human adult,
so is the unborn fetus. Would he oppose abortion on the same grounds? I suspect
not, but that is what his argument implies. More importantly, the whole idea
that potential confers rights is wrong. Being a potential club-member doesn't
give you the rights of a club-member; being a potential President doesn't
give you a right to Secret Service protection. Further, even if the idea
weren't already hopeless, the potential-reasoning-beings argument would contradict
his earlier claim that rights apply only to beings who actually have reason
and choice.
Or does Locke mean that babies and the mentally infirm have rights because
they already have reason, just not much or not fully developed? Then, there's
a different problem: If having reason to some small degree is enough to qualify
a being for rights, it will be hard to keep out the animals. Anyone who looks
at the evidence objectively will conclude either that other animals have
reason or else that lots of humans -- the babies, the senile, the mentally
incapacitated -- do not. Any standard lenient enough for a newborn baby to
count as having reason will say the same about many other animals, while
any standard strict enough to exclude all the non-human animals will exclude
a great many humans. When Locke wants to kick the other animals out, he raises
the bar very high -- can they talk? do they have concepts of property or
rights or reciprocity? do they have the ability to guide their actions by
a moral code? When he wants to let the babies in, on the other hand, he sets
the bar very low -- a bit of recognition and response to the world is all
he requires. The babies would flunk the test applied to animals, while lots
of animals could pass the test applied to babies. Only someone pushing a
double-standard could be comfortable thinking that all humans use reason,
but that no other animals do.
Has he advanced the discussion? I think not. He has only obscured the fact
that he is moving from one untenable position to another.
Professor Robert H. Bass
August 1, 2005
Robert
H. Bass, Ph.D, is Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy
at the University of North Florida. His current research centers upon the
relation of virtue ethics to politics and to our treatment of animals.
Email Robert Bass
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